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withdraw from the EU will leave the EU two years after the notification, unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period. In March and April 2019, based on a request by the UK 
Government, the European Council twice granted an extension under Article 50(3) 
TEU, postponing Brexit. This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the legal, 
political and institutional aspects of the most recent extension of the Brexit 
withdrawal period. For this purpose, it first provides an overview of the law of 
extension and in particular the relationship between extension, transition and 
revocation. Subsequently, it analyzes the politics of extension, explaining the reasons 
that pushed the UK to request it in spring 2019, and the conditions that the European 
Council attached to its decision allowing extension. Finally, the articles discusses the 
consequences of an extension on EU institutions, particularly the European 
Parliament, as well as on the functioning of the EU.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Leaving the European Union (EU) is easier said than done – as the United 
Kingdom (UK) realized in the Brexit process. Article 50(3) Treaty on the EU 
(TEU) states that,  
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the [withdrawing Member State] from 
the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two 
years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European 
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period.1  
The last sentence of the abovementioned provision allows postponing the 
exit date of a Member State which has notified its intention to leave the EU 
under Article 50(1) TEU, extending its membership of the EU beyond the 
two-year period triggered by the notification of withdrawal. Extension is 
decided by the European Council acting unanimously, and with the 
agreement of the withdrawing Member State.  
Even though Article 50(3) TEU explicitly foresees the possibility to postpone 
the exit date, a triggering of this provision appeared as beyond the realm of 
possibility for most of the Brexit negotiating process. When on 29 March 
2017 the UK notified its intention to withdraw from the EU, then Prime 
Minister Theresa May clearly indicated that her country would leave the EU 
by 29 March 20192 – a statement she subsequently repeated ad tedium.3 
However, in spring 2019 – faced with the reality of the draft withdrawal 
agreement being voted down three times by the UK Parliament, and 
conscious of the gigantic problems that a disorderly, no-deal Brexit would 
 
1 Emphasis added. 
2 Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, 
29 March 2017; and United Kingdom notification under Article 50 TEU, XT 
20001/17, 29 March 2017 
3 See, for instance, 'May - We are leaving the EU on March 29' Reuters (16 January 
2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-may-article50/may-we-are-
leaving-the-eu-on-march-29-idUSKCN1PA1M0> accessed 23 August 2019. 
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create to the national economy – the UK Prime Minister was forced to 
request twice an extension of UK membership in the EU,4 postponing Brexit 
to 31 October 2019. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze from a law and politics perspective 
the mechanism of extension, discussing also its short and long-term 
implications for the functioning of the EU. As the article claims, extension 
paradoxically confirms a contrario the resilience of the EU project, by 
revealing how difficult it is for a Member State to disentangle itself from one 
of the most successful systems of regional integration, without undermining 
its economy and unsettling its politics. At the same time, as the article points 
out, the extension of EU membership of a withdrawing Member State also 
creates new challenges for the EU itself. Because, contrary to what would 
happen in a transition period, in an extension period a withdrawing state 
maintains the rights and obligations of an EU Member State, the 
postponement of Brexit directly affected all the other 27 EU Member States 
(EU27), posing novel institutional challenges. 
In particular, the article explains that the extension of the UK’s membership 
of the EU had both short and long-term effects. On the one hand, in the short 
run, the postponement of Brexit created complications for the European 
Parliament (EP), as the UK had to participate in the elections for the 9th EP 
on 23 May 2019. However, because seats for the EP 2019-2024 had been 
reallocated among the EU27, extension implied that the EP composition had 
to be re-adapted last minute to include 73 UK-elected members of the EP 
(MEPs). This put on hold 27 seats that had in the meanwhile been re-
distributed to other 14 Member States – a situation likely to create litigation, 
since the 73 UK MEPs are supposed to leave after Brexit, while the new 
MEPs remain on hold. On the other hand, in the longer term, the extension 
of UK membership in the EU also forced the EU27 to deal with the new 
scenario of a withdrawing state which remains part of the EU, becoming a 
potential nuisance in the functioning of the EU. 
 
4 Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, 
20 March 2019; and Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European Council 
President Donald Tusk, 5 April 2019. 
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As the article suggests, therefore, the experience of the Brexit extension 
raises important lessons on the process of negotiating a withdrawal from the 
EU, as well as on the organization of the EU itself. If the postponement of 
Brexit is a boost for the irreversibility of the project of European integration, 
it is also a challenge for the EU, as a free Union of free states. If a Member 
State were to feel caged into the EU against its will, it could become a 
nuisance in the functioning of the EU itself. In fact, this risk quite quickly 
revealed itself with Brexit, as immediately following the second UK request 
for extending Article 50, leading Euroskeptic member of the UK Parliament 
Jacob Rees-Mogg called for the UK to become 'as difficult as possible', using 
the veto and other tricks to obstruct and oppose the EU from within.5 While 
the European Council sought to minimize this threat by calling on the UK to 
abide by the principle of sincere cooperation, it remains to be seen whether 
this will have any effect. In this context, therefore, the article concludes that 
it is in the EU's interest to draw lessons from the Brexit extension to 
reorganize its constitutional setup in such a way that Member States which 
are laggards in the process of integration do not interfere with the ambitions 
of others. 
As such, the article is structured as follows. Section II analyses in legal terms 
the characteristics of extension, as regulated by the TEU – explaining its 
difference from both transition and revocation. Section III overviews the 
practical application of Article 50(3) TEU in spring 2019, explaining the 
political and economic reasons that led the UK on 20 March and 10 April 
2019 to ask for an extension, and the institutional conditions that the 
European Council set in accepting the UK's requests. Section IV then 
considers the short-term implications of the Brexit extension, focusing on 
the changes and challenges this posed on the composition of the 9th EP. 
Section V, in contrast, discusses the long-term implications of the Brexit 
extension, reflecting on how this forces the EU27 to adapt its internal way of 
operation. It also considers how the EU can minimize the potential 
disruption posed by ongoing UK membership, including the effect this may 
have for differentiated integration in Europe's future.  
 
5 See tweet by Jacob Rees-Moog stating: 'If a long extension leaves us stuck in the 
EU we should be as difficult as possible. …' @Jacob_Rees_Mogg (Twitter, 5 April 
2019) . 
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II. THE LAW OF EXTENSION 
1. General Considerations 
Article 50 TEU establishes a three-step process by which a Member State can 
leave the EU in an orderly fashion. These are: first, the notification to the 
European Council outlining the intention to withdraw; second, the 
negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with arrangements regarding the 
withdrawal, taking into account the future relationship between the state and 
the Union; and finally the actual withdrawal.6 If after two years since the 
notification of the intention to leave the EU the withdrawing state and the 
EU have not concluded a withdrawal agreement, the withdrawing state could 
leave without an agreement. If however both the withdrawing state and the 
EU want to avoid a scenario of a disorderly exit, it is possible for the European 
Council, acting unanimously, and in agreement with the withdrawing state, 
to extend membership – postponing the exit date.7   
 
6 Paul Craig, 'How Brexit will be Carried out? The Process of Withdrawal' in 
Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017) 
49. 
7 The issue of extension has so far received limited in-depth analysis in scholarship. 
See Steve Peers, 'Trick or Treaty? The legal issues of the second extension of the 
UK's EU membership', EU Law Analysis (10 April 2019) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/trick-or-treaty-legal-issues-of second 
.html> accessed 23 August 2019; Oliver Patel and Clément Leroy, 'Extending 
Article 50: Legal and Political Considerations' UCL European Institute, Brexit 
Insights Series (15 March 2019) <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/sites/european-institute/files/article_50_extension_paper_final_0.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2019; Sam Fowles, 'Extending Article 50: Key Legal Issues' LSE 
Brexit Blog (20 March 2019) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/03/20/extending-
article-50-the-key-legal-issues/> accessed 23 August 2019. For a more general 
analysis of withdrawal, including references to the possibility of extension see 
Christophe Hillion, 'Withdrawal under Article 50 TEU: An integration-friendly 
process' (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 29-56; Piet Eeckhout and Eleni 
Frantziou, 'Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading' (2017) 54 
Common Market Law Review 695-733; EU Parliament Briefing, 'Article 50 TEU: 
Withdrawal of a Member State from the EU' (February 2016) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI
(2016)577971_EN.pdf> accessed 23 August 2019. 
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Extension is an option explicitly foreseen by Article 50(3) TEU. However, 
this Article only provides a fairly rudimentary framework, and, for instance, 
does not clearly indicate the possible purposes of an extension. In fact, the 
provision only sets out a number of procedural requirements to trigger the 
extension of the withdrawal period by stating that '[…] the European 
Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period.' 
As can be seen, Article 50(3) TEU describes extension in purely procedural 
terms. In particular, an extension of the withdrawal period can occur, 
provided that: 1) the European Council makes a unanimous decision and 2) 
that the concerned Member State agrees. This raises a number of questions 
regarding the specific nature of the extension foreseen in Article 50 (3) TEU. 
The first concerns the relationship between the European Council and the 
withdrawing state in the exercise of granting the extension. So far, in the case 
of Brexit, it was the withdrawing state which requested the extension.8 
However, the language of Article 50 TEU does not require that the 
withdrawing state makes such an application. In fact, albeit less likely, it 
seems possible that a decision to extend may be initiated also by the EU. 
What is, however, necessary in both cases is the unanimity of the European 
Council and the agreement by the Member State concerned. Therefore, an 
extension can never be put in place unilaterally but requires that all parties 
approve it. 
Article 50(3) TEU is instead silent on the substantive regulation of extension. 
However, once an extension is decided, the Member State which has notified 
its intention to leave the EU remains a Member State, with full rights and 
obligations. Yet, since that Member State is still on its way out of the EU, and 
therefore finds itself in the special situation foreseen by Article 50(4) TEU, it 
seems conceivable that the European Council may introduce conditions that 
apply to an extension. In fact, it must be emphasized that according to 
Article 50(3) TEU the European Council is under no obligation to grant the 
extension. In light of this, it appears justified for the European Council to 
make an extension dependent on conditions. However, a relevant legal 
 
8 See Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European Council President Donald 
Tusk, 20 March 2019 and Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European 
Council President Donald Tusk, 5 April 2019. 
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question is how far-reaching such conditions can be. Since the withdrawing 
state is still a Member State during the extension, it seems clear that the 
European Council cannot impose conditions that would go against the letter 
and the spirit of the EU treaties. For instance, if during an extension period 
the European Council were to ask the withdrawing Member State to apply 
rules from which it is exempted under the treaties, this would likely violate 
EU law. In fact, the conditions that the European Council may set during 
extension would still have to be consistent with the duty of sincere 
cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.9  
In summary, Article 50(3) TEU does not provide any rules regarding the 
specific arrangement of the extension. The Treaty only introduces a 
procedural requirement that extension be approved unanimously by the 
European Council in agreement with the withdrawing Member State. 
Instead it leaves open to the former the possibility to introduce conditions 
on extension, provided these are not incompatible with the EU treaties.  
2. Comparing Extension to Transition and Revocation 
From this viewpoint, extension differs from transition on the one hand, and 
revocation on the other. The Withdrawal Agreement concluded on 14 
November 2018,10 and the accompanying political declaration setting out the 
framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK,11 crucially 
put in place a so-called transition period which is intended to lead to the 
conclusion of a future trade agreement.12 The transition – or in UK parlance: 
implementation – period was conceived as a time-limited devise which would 
allow the UK, after leaving the EU to maintain some privileges of EU 
 
9 Article 4(3) TEU: 'Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and 
the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out 
tasks which flow from the Treaties.' 
10 See Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018 (14 November 
2018) TF50 (2018) 55. 
11 See Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom (22 November 2018) XT 
21095/18. 
12 Draft Agreement (n 10) Arts 126 - 132. 
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membership, including access to the internal market and customs union, in 
exchange for respect of EU laws and contributions to the EU budget. The 
focus here will be on how the transition period differs from the extension 
period.  
A transition period is not a legal requirement set out in Article 50 TEU but, 
in the case of Brexit, was put into the withdrawal agreement for practical 
considerations. In the case of the UK-EU agreement the transition period 
would have been set for an initial period until 31 December 2020, but with the 
possibility to extend it once further till December 2022. During the 
transition period the UK will no longer be an EU Member State, and as such 
will not be participating in the EU institutions. However, the UK would 
continue to be part of the EU customs union and the single market,13 and EU 
legislation, rules and court decisions would apply to the UK as to any other 
EU Member State.14 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the ECJ was to 
continue during this time,15 and the principle of supremacy and direct effect 
of EU law would also remain unchanged for this period. Importantly, the 
transition is more than just a timeframe to unwind existing relationships; 
rather it is designed to negotiate the actual post-withdrawal framework. As 
the outline political declaration concluded by the EU and UK in November 
2019 is still fairly open regarding the future EU-UK relationship, both sides 
would need to use this period to arrive at an actual final agreement.  
Compared to extension, a transition period comes with a number of 
similarities and one particular difference. In both circumstances Union law 
mostly applies and the UK remains bound by it. However, though being 
treated similar to a Member State for the time of the transition period, the 
UK is no longer a Member State. Membership would, in fact, require a 
renewed application under Article 49 TEU.  Not being a Member State also 
means that the UK no longer participates in EU institutions. This is different 
in the context of an extension. The UK remains a Member State with full 
duties and rights of membership. Furthermore, as will be outlined below, it 
 
13 Ibid Art 127 and Art 2a.  
14 European Commission, 'Fact Sheet Brexit Negotiations: What is in the 
Withdrawal Agreement' (14 November 2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-18-6422_en.htm> accessed 23 August 2019. 
15 Draft Agreement (n 10) Art 131. 
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continues to have the ability to unilaterally revoke its intention to withdraw, 
thus staying a full EU member without any additional requirements.  
Whereas during the transition period the exiting state ceases to be an EU 
Member State but might be treated similarly to one in certain areas, the 
situation is very different in the case of a revocation. In this scenario the 
concerned state stays in the Union and continues to be a full Member State 
without any further plans of exiting.  
Article 50 does not explicitly mention the revocation of the notification of 
withdrawal. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), however, ruled in 
Wightman that this is a possibility.16 The case was initiated by members of the 
UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the EP before the Court of 
Session in Scotland. In their petition they asked whether Article 50 TEU can 
be unilaterally revoked by the UK with the result that the UK could remain 
in the EU. On 3 October 2018 the Court of Session referred the case to the 
ECJ.17 In its ruling in December 2018 the ECJ, following the advice of the 
Advocate General,18 held that the UK does have the option to unilaterally 
revoke its withdrawal notification. As reasons the ECJ stated that  
the sovereign nature of the right of withdrawal enshrined in Article 50(1) 
TEU supports the conclusion that the Member State concerned has the 
right to revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the 
European Union, for as long as a withdrawal agreement concluded between 
the European Union and that Member State has not entered into force or, if 
no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period laid 
down in Article 50(3) TEU, possibly extended in accordance with that 
provision, has not expired.19  
Furthermore, the ECJ stressed that the option of revocation of the 
notification is also linked to the 13th recital in the preamble to the TEU, the 
first recital in the preamble to the TFEU and Article 1 TEU regarding the 
creation of an ever closer Union;20 as well as the importance of the values of 
 
16 Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others EU:C:2018:999. 
17 Ibid para 9-17. 
18 Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-
Bordona, delivered on December 4 2018 EU:C:2018:978, para 170. 
19 Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others EU:C:2018:999, para 57. 
20 Ibid para 61. 
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liberty and democracy as enshrined in the second and fourth recitals of the 
preamble to the TEU.21 According to the ECJ, an automatic end of 
membership after notification without the possibility to revoke that 
notification would amount to forced withdrawal of a Member State from the 
EU, if that state no longer wishes to exit. Such an outcome would be 
'inconsistent with the Treaties' purpose of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe'.22 At the same time, the ECJ clarified that 
revocation had to be conducted in good faith, and that this required the 
withdrawing state to follow for revocation the same domestic constitutional 
procedure it had used to notify its intention to withdraw.23 
If a Member State were to revoke its intention to leave the EU, according to 
the ECJ ruling the effect of this would be to return the state to its pre-Article 
50 status, as a full Member State of the EU, with all rights and obligations. 
Revocation, in other words, would terminate the withdrawal process. In this 
it differs from extension, since during the latter the withdrawing Member 
State maintains all its rights and obligations of membership, but is also still a 
withdrawing state, since it has notified its intention to leave the EU – and as 
such is subject to a special status, resulting from Article 50(4) TEU.  
In summary, extension constitutes a unique state where the withdrawing 
state remains a full Member State of the Union, with all rights and obligations 
(a difference from the transition period) and at the same time it also remains 
a withdrawing state, which still intends to end its EU membership (a 
difference from revocation). The unique circumstances of extension, 
therefore, create peculiar challenges, which will be discussed in the next 
section.  
III. THE POLITICS OF EXTENSION 
As mentioned, the European Commission Article 50 Task Force and the UK 
negotiators reached an agreement on a draft withdrawal treaty with an 
outline political declaration in November 2018.24 However, this agreement 
 
21 Ibid para 62. 
22 Ibid para 67. 
23 Ibid para 75. 
24 Draft Agreement (n 10). 
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was rejected by the UK Parliament on 15 January 2019 by a historic margin.25 
Furthermore, despite additional reassurances made by the EU,26 Parliament 
also turned the agreement down in a second vote on 12 March 2019.27 With 
the exit date of 29 March 2019 approaching, and on the clear understanding 
that a no-deal Brexit would have dramatic consequences for the UK 
economy28 – not to mention the lack of preparation of the UK administrative 
state for a disorderly withdrawal29 – the option of extending Article 50 TEU 
suddenly became politically palatable in the UK. 
As a result, on 20 March 2019 the UK Prime Minister requested a first 
extension of UK membership of the EU under Article 50(3) TEU until 30 
June 2019, with the aim to buy time to make another attempt at ratifying the 
withdrawal deal in Westminster.30 The European Council accepted the UK's 
request. However, aware of the legal and political difficulties that an 
extension would create on the approaching EP elections,31 the European 
 
25 See House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee, Response to the 
Vote on the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration: Options for 
Parliament, HC 1902, 16 January 2019. 
26 See Instrument relating to the agreement on the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community, 11 March 2019, TF50 (2019) 61. 
27 See House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee, Response to the 
12 March Vote on the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration. 
Thirteenth Report of Session, HC 2073, 13 March 2019. 
28 HM Government, 'HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU 
membership and the alternatives' (April 2016) <https://assets.publishing.service. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517415/treasury
_analysis_economic_impact_of_eu_membership_web.pdf> accessed 23 August 
2019. 
29 See National Audit Office, Contingency Preparations for Exiting the EU with No 
Deal,  HC 2058, 12 March 2019; House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, Brexit and the UK Border', HC 1942, 12 March 2019, 3 (stating that 
government 'departments have continued to struggle to prepare should the UK 
leave the EU without a deal' and reporting embarrassing cases of mismanagement 
of contingency preparations). 
30 See Prime Minister Theresa May, Letter to European Council President Donald 
Tusk, 20 March 2019. 
31 See European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, Letter to European 
Council President Donald Tusk, 11 March 2019 (stating that the UK exit 'should 
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Council only granted an extension until 12 April 2019 (the last date by which 
the UK had to organize the holding of EP elections), unless the UK 
Parliament approved the withdrawal agreement before 29 March 2019.32 Yet, 
the UK Parliament rejected the deal a third time on 29 March 2019 – the day 
when the UK was originally expected to leave the EU. As a result, on 5 April 
2019 the then Prime Minister Theresa May sent a letter to the European 
Council asking once again for an extension until 30 June 2019.33  
On 11 April, the European Council again accepted the request, but rejected 
the UK timeframe and rather set a flexible deadline.34 Specifically, the 
European Council stated that:  
Such an extension should last as long as necessary and, in any event, no longer 
than 31 October 2019. The European Council also recalls that, under Article 
50(3) TEU, the Withdrawal Agreement may enter into force on an earlier 
date, should the Parties complete their respective ratification procedures 
before 31 October 2019. Consequently, the withdrawal should take place on 
the first day of the month following the completion of the ratification 
procedures or on 1 November 2019, whichever is the earliest.35 
Moreover, the European Council clarified that the extension would end, with 
an automatic UK withdrawal on 1 June 2019, if the UK was still a member of 
the EU on 23-26 May 2019, had not ratified the Withdrawal Agreement by 22 
May 2019, and had failed to hold elections to the EP. The European Council 
justified this, by stressing that extension 
will have the consequence that the United Kingdom will remain a Member 
State until the new withdrawal date, with full rights and obligations in 
accordance with Article 50 TEU, and that the United Kingdom has a right 
 
be complete before the European Parliament elections that will take place between 
23-26 May [2019]. If the United Kingdom has not left the European Union by then, 
it will be legally required to hold these elections, in line with the rights and 
obligations of all Member States as set out in the Treaties'). 
32 European Council Decision (EU) 2019/476 taken in agreement with the United 
Kingdom of 22 March 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3)TEU [2019] OJ 
L 80 I/1. 
33 See Prime Minister May, Letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, 5 
April 2019. 
34 European Council Conclusions 10 April 2019, EUCO XT 20015/19, paras 2 and 3. 
35 Ibid para 9. 
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to revoke its notification at any time. If the United Kingdom is still a 
Member State on 23-26 May 2019, and if it has not ratified the Withdrawal 
Agreement by 22 May 2019, it will be under an obligation to hold the 
elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Union law. In the 
event that those elections do not take place in the United Kingdom, the 
extension should cease on 31 May 2019.36 
By so doing, the European Council effectively made extension conditional on 
the UK holding EP elections. Yet, as was outlined above,37 this is justified by 
the fact that the UK remains a member of the EU during the extension 
period, and as such is subject to EU obligations, including participating in EP 
elections. The European Council request is thus based on pre-existing 
obligations of the UK as a Member State rather than constituting a new 
condition imposed on the UK. 
At the same time, the European Council stressed the UK's responsibility as 
a continuous Member State of the EU, clarifying that '[t]his further 
extension cannot be allowed to undermine the regular functioning of the 
Union and its institutions.'38 In this regard, the European Council took note 
of the 'commitment by the United Kingdom to act in a constructive and 
responsible manner throughout the extension period in accordance with the 
duty of sincere cooperation'39 and stressed that it:  
expects the United Kingdom to fulfil this commitment and Treaty 
obligation in a manner that reflects its situation as a withdrawing Member 
State. To this effect, the United Kingdom shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Union's tasks and shall refrain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the Union's objectives, in particular when participating in 
the decision-making processes of the Union.40  
Finally, the European Council also pointed out that where appropriate, the 
other 27 EU Member States 'will continue to meet separately at all levels to 
 
36 Ibid para 10. 
37 See above, section II.1. 
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discuss matters related to the situation [of the EU] after the withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom.'41 
This condition set out by the European Council makes clear, therefore, that 
extension is subject to the UK acting in good faith vis-à-vis the EU. The 
European Council is thus not adding any additional obligations or burdens, 
but seeks to affirm at the highest political level that the UK should not use 
the extension to disrupt the functioning of the EU. What the European 
Council is intending here is to prevent the extension period from being used 
as potential weapon to jeopardize from within the functioning of the EU 
institutions, perhaps as a strategy to leverage concession in the withdrawal 
process. That said, it remains to be seen whether that risk can be truly 
avoided: the obligation to act in good faith applies to the UK government in 
the European Council and the Council, but cannot be required for instance 
from individual UK-elected MEPs. Since the recent EU elections brought 
about a significant number of Eurosceptic MEPs, it is likely that their actions 
will not abstain from 'undermining the functioning of the Union and its 
institutions.'  
As it is thus clear, the current extension does not only have consequences for 
the future of the withdrawal process and for UK internal political processes; 
it also affects the EU and its institutions. In fact, extension directly changes 
and challenges in significant and unprecedented ways also the composition 
of the EP, which is the focus of the next section.  
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTENSION 
The Brexit extension had significant consequences for the incoming 9th EP 
(2019-2024).42 Pursuant to Article 14 TEU, the EP shall consist of a maximum 
of 751 members. EP seats are allocated among the Member States according 
to the principle of degressive proportionality, on the basis of European 
Council decision, adopted unanimously on a proposal by the EP and with its 
consent. On 28 June 2018, the European Council had adopted a new decision 
 
41 Ibid para 8. 
42 See further Federico Fabbrini and Rebecca Schmidt, 'The Composition of the EP 
in Brexit Times' (2019) 44 European Law Review 710, from which this section 
draws.  
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on the composition of the EP for the 9th EP term (2019-2024).43 Taking stock 
of the decision of the UK to leave the EU (and therefore, of the reduction of 
the total EU population), the European Council decided to lower the overall 
number of MEPs from 751 to 705.44 At the same time, it decided to re-allocate 
27 of the 73 seats previously assigned to the UK to 14 other EU Member 
States, in order to better fulfil the criteria of degressive proportionality,45 
hence producing the re-allocation of seats described here.  
 
43 European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 of 28 June 2018 establishing the 
composition of the European Parliament [2018] OJ L 165I. 
44 An issue which goes beyond the remit of this article concerns instead the 
modalities of the elections of MEPs. On this see European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 4 July 2018 on the draft Council decision amending the Act 
concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 
September 1976, P8_TA(2018)0282. 
45 See also Leonard Besselink et al, 'The Impact of the UK's Withdrawal on the 
Institutional Set-up and Political Dynamics within the EU', study commissioned 
by the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs (April 2019).  
 




Member State MEPs 2014-2019 MEP 2019-2024 
(after Brexit) 
Variation 
Belgium 21 21  
Bulgaria 17 17  
Czech Republic  21 21  
Denmark 13 14 +1 
Germany 96 96  
Estonia 6 7 +1 
Ireland 11 13 +2 
Greece 21 21  
Spain 54 59 +5 
France  74 79 +5 
Croatia 11 12 +1 
Italy 73 76 +3 
Cyprus  6 6  
Latvia 8 8  
Lithuania 11 11  
Luxembourg 6 6  
Hungary 21 21  
Malta 6 6  
Netherlands 26 29 +3 
Austria 18 19 +1 
Poland 51 52 +1 
Portugal 21 21  
Romania 32 33 +1 
Slovenia 8 8  
Slovakia 13 14 +1 
Finland 13 14 +1 
Sweden  20 21 +1 
UK 73 0 -73 
Total 751 705  
 
Nevertheless, the 2018 European Council decision on the new composition 
of the EP also envisioned a safeguard clause. In anticipation of a (possible, 
although then unlikely) scenario where the UK were to remain an EU 
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Member State at the time of the May 2019 EP elections, Article 3(2) of 
European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 stated that 
in the event that the United Kingdom is still a Member State of the Union at 
the beginning of the 2019-2024 parliamentary term, the number of 
representatives in the European Parliament per Member State taking up 
office shall be the one provided for in Article 3 of the European Council 
Decision 2013/312/EU until the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
Union becomes legally effective.46  
Moreover, that same provision foresaw that, '[o]nce the United Kingdom's 
withdrawal from the Union becomes legally effective, the number of 
representatives in the European Parliament elected in each Member State 
shall be the one provided' by the new allocation criteria, with the 
consequence that:  
All representatives in the European Parliament who fill the additional seats 
resulting from the difference between the number of seats allocated in the 
first and second subparagraphs shall take up their seats in the European 
Parliament at the same time.47 
The Brexit extension therefore had significant consequences for the 
incoming 9th EP (2019-2024). As was clearly requested by the European 
Council in granting the second extension,48 the UK had to participate in EP 
elections on 23 May 2019. This required as a necessity to continue the old 
allocations of seats applied in the 8th EP term (2014-2019),49 scrapping at the 
last minute the new plan to re-allocate seats. This had two main 
consequences: on the one hand, the Brexit extension produced a suspensive 
condition for the extra 27 MEPs elected in 14 Member States; and on the 
other hand, it also produced a resolutive condition for the 73 UK-elected 
MEPs who joined the 9th EP but are supposed to vacate their seats after 
Brexit has taken effect. Both of these situations raise novel legal issues.  
 
46 European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 (n 43) Art 3(2). 
47 Ibid. 
48 European Council Conclusions EUCO XT 20015/19 (n 34) para 3. 
49 European Council Decision 2013/312/EU of 28 June 2013 establishing the 
composition of the European Parliament [2013] OJ L 181, Art 3. 
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1. Suspensive condition 
There are 27 future MEPs who were not able to take up their mandate at the 
start of the new EP term on 2 July 2019, being held back from taking seats in 
the EP until the UK leaves the EU. This raises at least three distinct issues. 
First, how can the ex-post allocation be organized from a logistical point of 
view? Second, is it possible from a constitutional law perspective to elect 
MEPs based on a suspensive condition, or is this at odds with the rights of 
their mandates? And finally, and related to the last point, is such conditional 
election in line with the constitutional requirements of the electoral process?  
Concerning the first issue, the last-minute extension of the withdrawal 
period caused logistical challenges regarding the allocation of MEPs. 
However, some Member States had foreseen in their domestic legislation 
how to deal with the possibility that the UK could remain in the EU, and 
therefore that the extra EP seats assigned to the country pursuant to 
European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 could not be actually be put into 
action. Ireland's European Parliament Elections (Amendment) Act 2019, for 
instance, envisaged the scenario of a delayed Brexit and therefore included a 
clause that allows limiting the accession of the extra MEPs to the EP until 
the Brexit issue is resolved.50 Section 6 of the 2019 Act provided that the 
newly elected extra MEPs 'shall not take up their seats in the European 
Parliament until such time as a date has been specified by the Parliament for 
the taking up of such seats.'51 
Moreover, other Member States adopted last minute, ad hoc legislative 
measures to deal with the UK's continuing membership and its impact on the 
forthcoming EP elections. For instance, France approved a special statute on 
22 May 2019 – four days before the EP elections – which temporarily put on 
hold the five additional seats that France would have received according to 
the new composition of the EP.52 Similar provisions were made in other 
Member States affected by European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937, 
 
50 See European Parliament Elections (Amendment) Act 2019. 
51 Ibid sec 6(j). 
52 See Loi n° 2019-487 du 22 mai 2019 relative à l'entrée en fonction des représentants 
au Parlement européen élus en France aux élections de 2019, JORF n°0119 du 23 
mai 2019. 
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including Spain53 and Poland.54 There are, however, also Member States 
which did not adapt their national legislation. Yet, this does not necessary 
mean that these countries do not have a procedure in place to deal with the 
issue and will not able to allocate the additional seats at a later point in time. 
For instance, in Austria, which uses an electoral system of proportional 
representation (PR) with the application of the d'Hondt system to return 
seats, together with the option to name or rank individual candidates from 
the party list, a ranking will clearly establish which candidate can enter the 
EP.55 While it remains to be seen how smoothly such unprecedented 
procedures will run in the affected Member States once Brexit does 
materialize, the first, logistical issue appears to be manageable, despite its 
novelty.  
A legally more complicated question is instead the second one – whether 
from a constitutional point of view a suspensive condition is at odds with the 
rights and privileges linked to the office of MEPs. However, here it is 
important to reiterate that the MEP status for the 27 representatives that will 
only join the EP after Brexit is conditional. Thus, they will only receive their 
 
53 See Real Decreto 206/2019 (1 de abril, 2019) (stating that '[d]e conformidad con el 
artićulo 3.2 de la Decisioń (UE) 2018/937 del Consejo Europeo, una vez sea 
jurid́icamente efectiva la salida del Reino Unido, los cinco nuevos escanõs que 
corresponden a Espanã serań asignados por la Junta Electoral Central a las 
candidaturas a las que puedan corresponder como consecuencia de la aplicacioń de 
las reglas establecidas en el artićulo 216 de la Ley Orgańica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, a 
los resultados del proceso electoral celebrado el 26 de mayo de 2019, sin que sea 
necesario realizar nuevas elecciones.')  
54 See Law of 4 April 2019 establishing principles of the order of filling in the 
mandates of the deputies for the European Parliament elected by Poland for 2019-
2024 term (Dz.U. 2019 poz 708) (foreseeing that, applying existing provisions of the 
Electoral Code, the National Electoral Commission indicates which electoral 
committee received 52nd quotient. In the next step, the National Electoral 
Commission checks which MEP elected from the list of that committee received 
the lowest number of votes). Since Art 329 § 1 of the Electoral Code states that 
Poland elects as many MEP as indicated in EU law no further amendments were 
necessary.  
55 See Bundesgesetz über die Wahl der Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments, § 75 
(Ermittlung des vorläufigen Wahlergebnisses durch die Bundeswahlbehörde) in 
combination with § 77 (Ermittlung der Mandate durch die Bundeswahlbehörde) 
and § 78 (Zuweisung der Mandate, Niederschrift, Verlautbarung). 
 
106 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
mandates if the suspensive condition – Brexit – occurs. French legislation in 
this regard is particularly explicit as it states that '[c]es candidats prennent 
leur fonction de représentants au Parlement européen à compter de la date 
du retrait du Royaume-Uni de l'Union européenne.'56 This point was further 
clarified in the press release of the Council of Ministers which approved the 
emergency legislation as meaning that 'tant qu'ils n'entrent pas effectivement 
en fonction, les droits et obligations attachés à la qualité de représentants au 
Parlement européen ne leur sont pas opposables, notamment en matière 
d'incompatibilités.'57  
It is important to note that all legislatures foresee the possibility of members 
joining at a later stage in the case that the originally elected representative is 
no longer able to fulfil his or her mandate.58 There is, however, a qualitative 
difference between such a procedure and the case at hand. Substitute 
candidates are not elected but are simply on a substitute list. The 27 future 
MEPs under discussion here are instead elected, even though they can only 
take up their seats at a later stage of the parliamentary period. Given the 
nature of a suspensive condition, and the uncertainty around the UK's 
withdrawal from the EU, this later stage might never even materialize. 
Nonetheless, given that these MEPs in waiting have not taken up their 
mandate they have not yet attained the rights and privileges linked to it. 
Consequently, the suspensive condition does not violate constitutionally 
protected rights linked to the status of MEP.  
Related to these considerations is the third issue, which concerns the effects 
of a suspensive condition on the representational system. The 2019 EP 
elections provide the novelty of a partially conditional election. The 
materialization of the people's vote will depend on an outside factor – Brexit. 
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any precedent for such an 
approach and it is unclear whether this procedure has any impact on the 
 
56 See Loi n° 2019-487 du 22 mai 2019 relative à l'entrée en fonction des représentants 
au Parlement européen élus en France aux élections de 2019, JORF n°0119 du 23 
mai 2019, Art. unique. 
57 'Compte rendu du Conseil des ministers du 24 avril 2019' 
<https://www.gouvernement.fr/conseil-des-ministres/2019-04-24/entree-en-
fonctions-des-representants-au-parlement-europeen> accessed 23 August 2019.  
58 See for instance Legge 24 gennaio 1979, n. 18 Elezione dei membri del Parlamento 
europeo spettanti all'Italia, G.U. n. 29 del 30 gennaio 1979, Art 6. 
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credibility and the trust in the electoral system. If an elected candidate is not 
able to take up her office due to ongoing political negotiations about Brexit, 
her electorate might consider their vote to be cast in vain. This might cause 
doubts on the democratic nature of the elections and in turn of the Union, 
which is clearly envisaged in Article 13 TEU. However, the recent elections 
indicate that such fears are unfounded. Rather than doubt and suspicion 
about democratic representation within the Union, the May 2019 EP 
elections saw the highest participation in the history of the Union. Thus, it 
appears that, among other factors, the ongoing political debates about Brexit 
revitalized democratic processes within the Union rather than stifling 
them.59  
In sum, it seems that the issues arising from the suspensive effects of a 
prolonged Brexit are in line with broader EU constitutional law 
requirements. The EU and its Member States have taken legislative measures 
to regulate the problem. As a result, this procedure, albeit novel, will be based 
on legal grounds. Furthermore, the 27 MEPs which would have been elected 
had it not been because of a Brexit extension, will not take up their mandate 
until after the UK withdraws from the EU. Thus, they will not be bestowed 
with any official right or obligations; and the Brexit condition will therefore 
not interfere with any prerogatives linked to the mandate. 
2. Resolutive condition 
More problematic about the current arrangement is the situation of the 73 
MEPs which were elected in the UK. According to the European Council 
Decision, these MEPs are supposed to leave the EP after Brexit has 
materialized.60 Article 3(2) of European Council Decision 2018/937 seems to 
consider this almost a technicality, by envisaging a termination of the UK 
mandates and an automatic transition to the new EP composition-key. 
 
59 See French President Emmanuel Macron, Letter, 4 March 2019, available at: 
https://www.elysee.fr/es/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/pour-une-renaissance-
europeenne.fr accessed 13 September 2019 (citing Brexit as a reason to participate 
to EU elections). 
60 European Council Decision (EU) 2018/937 (n 43), Art 3(2). European Council 
Decision (EU) 2019/584 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom of 11 April 
2019 extending the period under Article 50(3) TEU [2019] OJ L 101, recital 11.  
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However, here the question arises whether, and under what conditions, these 
MEPs can be required to give up their seats and leave the EP before the 
termination of their regular term of office. Unlike the MEPs on the "waiting 
lists" discussed above, these 73 MEPs have fully taken their office with the 
elections on 23 May 2019. Thus, at the time when they are supposed to leave 
the EP they have a valid mandate and fully enjoy the rights and privileges that 
come with the status of being a MEP. The fact that Brexit could have a 
resolutive effect on the mandate of UK-elected MEPs raises profound 
constitutional questions. 
A series of arguments are mentioned to support this conclusion. First, from 
the perspective of classic public international law, a Member State's 
withdrawal from a treaty entails exit by its representatives from all the treaty 
institutions.61 Second, from the perspective of administrative law, Brexit 
deprives UK-elected MEPs of the citizenship requirements to serve within 
the EU institutions.62 And third, from the perspective of democratic theory, 
it may seem unfair for UK-elected MEPs to take decisions that affect EU 
citizens after the UK is no longer an EU Member State.63 
Yet, none of these arguments seem to withstand careful scrutiny. First, the 
ECJ has repeatedly argued that the EU constitutes a new legal order,64 and 
that EU constitutional law rather than public international law governs its 
functioning.65 Second, the administrative view seems to clash with the fact 
that not only UK citizens can be elected as MEPs in the UK; in fact, EU law 
entitles EU citizens to run in EP elections in the UK,66 and UK electoral law 
 
61 See Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Art 70. 
62 See also Herwig CH Hoffmann, ‘The impact of Brexit on the legal status of 
European Union officials and other servants of British nationality’, study 
commissioned by the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
(December 2017). 
63 See Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998)  78 (explaining that 
democracy is based on the principle of affected interests, whereby people vote on 
matters that affect them). 
64 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos EU:C:1963:1. 
65 Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others EU:C:2018:999. 
66 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art 39 ('1. Every citizen 
of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the 
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extends the passive suffrage even to non-EU citizens.67 As a result, there is a 
handful of MEPs elected in the UK on 23 May 2019 who are either dual 
nationals or actually not British citizens at all.68 Clearly, Brexit would not 
remove the EU citizenship requirement to hold office (at least for them). 
Third, the democratic argument disregards the fact that already today UK-
elected MEPs were fully involved within the EP even in deciding matters – 
for example on the governance of the Eurozone, or Schengen – to which the 
UK was not actually participating in, due to its various opt-outs from key 
areas of European integration.69 
In fact, there are strong constitutional arguments why the 73 UK-elected 
MEPs cannot be forced to leave their seats after Brexit.70 Whereas the old 
text of Article 189 TEC stated that the EP represented 'the peoples of the 
States brought together in the Community', Article 14(2) TEU proclaims that 
the 'European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of Union 
citizens', and Article 14(3) states that 'members of the European Parliament 
shall be elected for a term of five years.' As a result, the EP today is an 
institution which represents EU citizens, and not citizens of the EU Member 
 
European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State.') 
67 See European Parliament Elections Act 2002, sec. 10(3A). See also Case C-145/04 
Spain v. United Kingdom EU:C:2006:543 (upholding the UK legislation extending 
the franchise for EP elections to third-country nationals who are Commonwealth 
citizens residing in Gibraltar). 
68 See also 'The Brexit Vote: Here are all the MEPs elected for Britain and Northern 
Ireland', The Journal (28 May 2019) <https://www.thejournal.ie/british-european-
vote-meps-brexit-4654763-May2019/> accessed 23 August 2019 (reporting the 
names of all the 73 MEPs elected in Great Britain and Norther Ireland, and 
indicating that among others Henrik Overgaard-Nielsen (Brexit Party) has dual 
British and Danish citizenship; Irina Von Wiese (Lib Dems) has British and 
German citizenship; Christian Allard (SNP) has British and French citizenship; 
and Martina Anderson (Sinn Fein) has only Irish (not British) citizenship).  
69 See for a discussion of this problem: Deirdre Curtin and Cristina Fasone, 
'Differentiated Representation: Is a Flexible European Parliament Desirable?' in 
Bruno De Witte et al (eds) Between Flexibility and Disintegration: The State of EU Law 
Today (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017).  
70 Federico Fabbrini, 'The Institutional Consequences of a 'Hard Brexit'', study 
commissioned by the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
(May 2018).  
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States. This is evidenced by the fact that current members of the EP elected 
in the UK have been voted into office also by non-British EU citizens 
resident in the UK who exercised their voting rights for EP elections in 
accordance with Article 22(2) TFEU, Article 39 EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and Directive 93/109/EC.71 In fact, contrary to what has occurred in 
the European Council and the Council since the notification of withdrawal, 
MEPs elected in the UK have not been excluded from Brexit-related 
deliberations and decisions within the EP.  
In light of the above, it seems possible to claim that the constitutional 
principle of representative democracy codified in Article 10(2) TEU, 
according to which 'citizens are directly represented at Union level in the 
European Parliament', allows MEPs elected in the UK to serve their role for 
the full length of their five-year mandate.72 Moreover, another institutional 
factor has to be accounted for in support of this conclusion. The new EP 
elects a new European Commission. Pursuant to Article 17(7) TEU the 
President of the European Commission 'shall be elected by the European 
Parliament by a majority of its component member'; the EP scrutinizes the 
candidates put forward by the Member States for the role of Commissioners; 
and '[t]he President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the other members of the Commission shall 
be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament.'73 The 
fact that the EP is constitutionally mandated to approve the formation of the 
new Commission means that a relation of confidence is developed between 
these two institutions.74 Modifying the composition of the EP in the course 
of its 9th term, therefore, would unsettle the inter-institutional relation 
between the EP and the Commission, potentially affecting the confidence in 
the Commission itself. 
 
71 Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed 
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which they are not nationals [1993] OJ 1993 L 329/34. 
72 See also Protocol (No 7) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, 
Art 9. 
73 Art 17(7) TEU. 
74 See Editorial comments, 'After the European elections: Parliamentary games and 
gambles' (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 1047. 
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In fact, an ex post change in the composition of the EP, with a departure after 
Brexit of 73 UK-elected MEPs – the third largest national delegation in the 
EP – would inevitably alter the political equilibria within the EP. This is 
particularly relevant in 2019 since the President-elect of the European 
Commission Ursula von der Leyen – who was nominated by the European 
Council on 2 July 2019,75 following a long wrangling between the heads of state 
and government, which led to the abandonment of the Spitzenkandidaten 
method76 – was approved in her post by the EP on 16 July 2019 with a margin 
of only nine votes: 383 for, 327 against, with 22 blank and one annulled votes – 
the required majority being 374 votes.77 As it quickly appeared, in securing 
President Von der Leyen's election, the votes of a number of UK-elected 
MEPs proved influential, including the ten Labour MEPs (who sit in the 
Socialists & Democrats group), the four Conservative Party MEPs (who sit in 
the group of European Conservative and Reformists) and crucially the 16 
Liberal Democrats (Lib-Dems) members of the newly created group Renew 
Europe. If, of course, such MEPs were to leave the EP after Brexit –  although 
together with the 29 MEPs of the Brexit Party, who strongly opposed 
President Von der Leyen – this will affect the political equilibria within the 
EP, potentially depriving the European Commission of the mathematical 
majority on which it relies within the EP, and forcing a governmental crisis in 
the EU.  
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND EXTENSION 
In conclusion, the Brexit extension created short-term changes and 
challenges to the functioning of the EP, which are likely to lead to litigation. 
As we explained, the suspensive condition that Brexit has on 27 MEPs seems 
to be legally acceptable, and practically manageable, since these individuals 
 
75 See European Council Conclusions, 2 July 2019, EUCO 18/19. 
76 See European Council President Donald Tusk, statement, 28 May 2019 (indicating 
that 'there can be no automaticity' in the appointment of the European 
Commission President in light of EP election results). 
77 See European Parliament, 'Press Release - European Parliament Elects Ursula von 
der Leyen as first Female Commission President' (16 July 2019) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190711IPR56824/ 
parliament-elects-ursula-von-der-leyen-as-first-female-commission-president> 
accessed 23 August 2019. 
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do not actually acquire any prerogative as MEPs until a future point in time 
when the UK leaves the EU. Instead, profound constitutional questions 
would result from the resolutive condition. Constitutional arguments related 
to the nature of MEPs, and institutional considerations connected to the 
electoral relation between the EP and the Commission, suggest that UK-
elected MEPs cannot be forced to vacate their seats after Brexit, and before 
the end of their five-year mandate. Yet, as Article 14 TEU sets a fixed, 
maximum number of 751 MEPs, if the 73 UK-elected MEPs do not forfeit 
their seats after Brexit, it becomes impossible for the extra 27 MEPs that 
could be subsequently re-deployed from 14 other Member States to take up 
these seats. The adoption of a special protocol would therefore be required, 
as we suggested elsewhere.78 
However, the Brexit extension has implications also for the other EU 
institutions. On 19 August 2019, the UK Government announced that it will 
stop attending most meetings of the Council of the EU as of 1 September 
2019.79 As explained by the UK Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, Stephen 
Barclays, '[t]his will free up time for Ministers and their officials to get on 
with preparing for our departure on October 31 [2019].'80 Nevertheless, the 
UK Government clarified that it will continue to attend meetings of the 
Council of the EU, 'where the UK has a significant national interest in the 
outcome of discussions'81 – listing meetings on UK exit, sovereignty, 
international relations, security, or finance as examples. As such, while the 
UK Government indicated that this 'decision is not intended in any way to 
frustrate the functioning of the EU'82 – and correspondingly arranged to 
delegate pursuant to Article 239 TFEU its voting rights to Finland, as the 
Member State holding the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU – 
 
78 See Fabbrini and Schmidt (n 42). 
79 UK Government, 'Press release, UK officials will stop attending most EU meetings 
from 1 September' (20 August 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-
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the move signaled a willingness to continuously leverage its involvement in 
the EU to protect its 'ongoing national interest.'83 
Moreover, on 23 August 2019, the UK Government also announced that it 
would not nominate a UK Commissioner for the 2019-2024 term.84 Even 
though pursuant to Article 17(5) TEU, as amended by a decision of the 
European Council, the Commission shall consist of one national for each 
Member State,85 the UK refrained from nominating 'a UK Commissioner for 
the new Commission' in view of the intention of the new Prime Minister to 
leave the EU by 31 October 2019.86 As the UK Permanent Representative to 
the EU Sir Tim Barrows explained in a letter to the head of the transition 
team of the new European Commission President, this move is 'not intended 
to stop the EU appointing a new Commission,'87 and the UK  
will not object to the Council, in accordance with Article 17(7) [TEU] and in 
agreement with the President-elect, adopting the list of candidates for the 
appointment as members of the Commission and communicating that list to 
the European Parliament.88   
As a result, by deciding unilaterally not to exercise its right to nominate a 
European Commissioner, and by choosing selectively whether to exercise its 
right to participate in EU Council meetings, the UK has been affecting the 
composition and decision-making process of other EU institutions. 
 
83 Ibid. 
84 UK Government, 'Press Release, The UK will not nominate a new Commissioner 
to the EU' (23 August 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uk-will-
not-nominate-a-new-commissioner-to-the-eu> (accessed 29 August 2019). 
85 See in fact European Council Decision 2013/272/EU of 22 May 2013 concerning the 
number of members of the European Commission, [2013] OJ L 165/98, Art 1 
(stating that '[t]he Commission shall consist of a number of members [...] equal to 
the number of Member States'). Technically this sets a fixed number for the size of 
the college of Commissioner: 28, so it remains to be seen how this can be squared if 
the UK extends further its EU membership without appointing a Commissioner. 
86 Ambassador Sir Tim Barrow, 'Letter to the Head of Transition Team (European 
Commission President-elect) and the Secretary General of the Council of the 
European Union' (23 August 2019) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/827315/Nomination_of
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Therefore, while still remaining during the extension period an EU Member 
State 'with full rights and obligations',89 the UK is carving out for itself a 
diminished membership status, with only partial involvement in the 
governance of the EU. Yet, this condition of semi-membership could drag on 
for a much longer time, raising important constitutional questions for 
Europe's long-term future. In fact, the new President of the European 
Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, already indicated that she would be 
open to a further extension of UK membership.90 This scenario is likely given 
the constitutional crisis that has played out in the UK since Boris Johnson 
took over as Prime Minister.  
Following the decision by Prime Minister Johnson on 28 August 2019 to 
prorogue Parliament, on 3 September 2019 Westminster voted to seize 
control of the parliamentary agenda. With an emergency motion it tabled for 
discussion a piece of legislation designed to take the risk of a hard Brexit off 
the table and impose on the PM the duty to seek with the EU a further 
extension under Article 50 TEU in case a deal had not been found.91 The bill, 
which was drafted by Labour MP Hillary Benn, the Chairman of the Brexit 
Select Committee, was approved at record speed on 4 September 2019, by a 
majority of 328 to 301, with the crucial vote of moderate Tory MPs. It 
specifically requires the UK Government to seek an extension until at least 
31 January 2020, thus further proroguing the UK membership in the EU, to 
buy extra time to arrange an orderly exit and avert a no-deal. 
However, the ongoing membership of a withdrawing Member State poses 
institutional issues for the future of the EU: the EU is a free Union of free 
states, all of which have willingly decided to share their sovereignty on a 
reciprocal basis to federate into a supranational organization. In fact, if a 
state were to feel caged into the EU against its will, this may challenge the 
constitutional compact on which the Union is based, and such state could 
become a nuisance in the functioning of the EU itself. We have already 
 
89 See European Council Conclusions EUCO XT 20015/19 (n 34) para 6. 
90 See European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen, speech at the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, 16 July 2019 (indicating that the withdrawal 
agreement cannot be renegotiated but that the Commission is willing to further 
extend UK membership of the EU in October 2019 if necessary). 
91 European Union (Withdrawal) Act (No. 2) 2019. 
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mentioned the threat of Jacob Rees Mogg, a leader of the pro-Brexit camp, 
to make the UK as difficult as possible during the extension period.92 With 
the recent appointment of Boris Johnson as the new UK Prime Minister, 
Rees Mogg has now become Leader of the House – that is the chief whip of 
the Tory majority in the House of Commons – and there is a risk that such 
strategy of undermining the Union from within may be put into action.93 If 
faced with further extensions such sentiments are likely to grow. Even 
though a UK government might not adopt such a subversive position 
outright, it will be pressured by these forces, as it has been before and 
throughout the Brexit process. Thus, it will likely oppose policies that, 
although highly beneficial for the EU itself, might be less so for a third state. 
And the longer the extension lasts the more likely it is that these problems 
will intensify.  
It is precisely to avert this threat that the European Council in accepting the 
second extension requested the UK government to act in a constructive and 
responsible manner throughout the extension period in compliance with the 
Treaty-based duty of sincere cooperation.94 Yet, it is not clear whether this 
can be expected, and much less enforced – which raises the important 
question of whether the EU should in fact start thinking about more 
structural institutional solutions to accommodate different tiers of 
membership within its ranks. If two years of Brexit talks have proved the 
difficulties of leaving the EU, the 2016 Brexit referendum unearthed 
uneasiness with the EU that the Union would ignore at its own peril. And if 
the UK is due to remain in the EU for a while more, with Brexit postponed 
ad Kalendas Graecas, it is certainly in the EU's interest to reorganize its 
constitutional setup in such a way that states who are laggards in the process 
of integration do not interfere with the ambitions of others.95  
 
92 Tweet by Jacob Rees-Moog (n 5). 
93 Alistair Smout, 'UK PM Johnson appoints Rees-Mogg as leader of the House of 
Commons' Reuters (24 July 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-
leader-reesmogg/uk-pm-johnson-appoints-rees-mogg-as-leader-of-the-house-of-
commons-idUSKCN1UJ31I> accessed 23 August 2019. 
94 See European Council Conclusions EUCO XT 20015/19 (n 34) para 7. 
95 See e.g. Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Penn Press 2017); George Soros, 'How to Save 
Europe' Project Syndacate (29 May 2018); and Sergio Fabbrini, Europe's Future (CUP 
2019). 
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In other words, the EU itself should promote constitutionally entrenched 
mechanisms of institutional differentiation where states with diverse visions 
of integration can coexist without undermining each other. The way for the 
EU to do so is to assume a clear constitutional differentiation between the 
internal market, on the one hand, and a political and economic union, on the 
other.96 Effectively, there are two Europes in the EU today — one political 
and economic in nature and another purely focused on market integration. 
These Europes have coexisted for many years, but Brexit has actually made 
their difference crystal clear. If the Brexit postponement is a boost for the 
irreversibility of the project of European integration, it is also a challenge for 
a free Union of free states. In this context, a treaty reform to differentiate 
tiers of membership and levels of commitments between Member States 
must emerge as an indispensable way forward.
 
96 See further Federico Fabbrini and Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'Is the EU Prepared if 
the UK Were to Stay?', EU News (10 January 2019) <https://www.eunews.it 
/2019/01/10/eu-prepared-if-the-uk-were-to-stay-bremain/112827> accessed 23 
August 2019.  
